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Abstract. The title of this paper was inspired by an etymology formulated in 1929 by a famous Gold 
Coast maìtre-a-penser, J. de Graft Johnson. He explained the most common akan
1 term for a chief ohene
2 
as a derivation from hye, boundary, with the meaning of “he who would decide the ohi (boundary) 
between the various groups farming on lands commonly reputed to be under his control” (de Graft 
Johnson, 1929). The ohene is therefore ‘the settler of the boundary’.  
Etymology is a tricky territory and I am not sure whether this interpretation is reliable. However it suits 
perfectly what I intend to say in my paper: 
1)  Controversial as Chieftaincy may be in Ghana, it is perhaps the clearest embodiment of shared 
concepts of what it means to belong to a place.  
2)  The link between Chieftaincy and place is not a static one. To a great extent chiefs have the power to 
redefine the very nature, size and scope of the place/locality they embody.  
3)  They are potentially in a better position to re-shape, manipulate, enlarge or shrink boundaries than 
most other player on the national stage.  
4)  From the early 1990s many of them were able to exercise that power to an extent they had not 
experienced since colonial days and in ways new to Ghanaian society and to themselves.  
I will try to substantiate my points through reference to a recent case of chieftaincy litigation in the 
Western Region of Ghana.   
                                                 
1 Akan constitute the main language group in Ghana and its main variety, Twi, is by far the most spoken 
African language in the country, with controversial aspirations to become the National language. This 
paper was presented at the conference Beside the State New Forms of Political Power in Post-1990 
Africa, Università di Milano-Bicocca 15-17 December 2005. 
2 The term ohene (pl. ahene) is applied to chiefs ranking above a village head (odikro). It is also used as a 
suffix in order to describe: a) the specific area of a chief’s jurisdiction ( es. Asantehene: the ruler of 
Asante;  Agonahene: the chief of Agona); b) rank and function of particular offices (asafohene: a military 
commander or the head of an asafo company; gyaasehene: the head of the chief’s servants, etc.). 
Referring to chiefs and chiefly families as a social body you say ahenfo.   2
1. Chieftaincy in Ghana: hardly a non-state player 
During the past two decades, Chieftaincy or ‘Traditional Rule’ has been experiencing a 
substantial revival in several Sub-Saharan Africa countries (Rouveroy & van Dijk eds., 
1999; Perrot & Fauvelle-Aymar eds., 2003; Vaughan ed., 2003). In West Africa this is 
particularly true of Francophone countries, where chiefs often found themselves in a 
weak position for most of the four decades following independence, sometimes to the 
point of virtual irrelevance (Benin) or near extinction (Guinea Conakry).  
In a recent essay by Pierre Englebert
3 Ashanti is listed, together with Buganda and 
KwaZulu, among the most prominent cases of so-called ‘indigenous kingdoms’ that 
underwent a ‘resurgence’ during the past 10-15 years, after the recognition of 
Traditional Structures of Government was enshrined in the Constitutions of Ghana, 
Uganda and South Africa.     
I can agree about the case of Buganda, but I do not think that terms like ‘resurgence’ 
and ‘revival’ are really applicable to the recent history of Ashanti and Ghanaian 
Chieftaincy. The reason is that in post-independence Ghana chiefs qua chiefs were 
constantly crucial elements in national and local power games, both as focal points for 
identities, and as players directly involved in their institutional and individual 
capacities. This is generally accepted and has been the subject of various studies (e.g. 
Chazan, 1983; Owusu, 1987, 1996).  
It is hard to define Ghanaian Chieftaincy a ‘non-state’ player. It is an integral part of the 
national life – and of the state as well. Chieftaincy is explicitly recognised and regulated 
under the Constitutions of the Fourth and Fifth Republics (Republic of Ghana 1979, 
1992), which incorporated and consolidated a substantive corpus of legislation passed 
during colonial times and after independence: in particular the Chiefs Recognition Act 
(Ghana, 1959) and the two Chieftaincy Acts (Republic of Ghana, 1961, 1971). The 
1992 Constitution – currently in force – recognizes the historic legitimacy of 
Chieftaincy and guarantees its autonomy from state intrusions in its specific domains: 
thus putting a stop – at least in legal theory – to the heavy-handed government 
interference that had been going on since the days of Kwame Nkrumah (Rathbone, 
2000). The Constitution explicitly forbids the abolition of Chieftaincy by legislation and 
                                                 
3 See Vaughan (2003).   3
denies Parliament the power to legislate to the detriment of the institution in any 
manner.  
The power of recognizing chiefs or withholding recognition – a crucial weapon in the 
hands of previous governments and regimes – is given collectively to Chiefs 
themselves, constituted in a hierarchy of corporate bodies. In fact the Constitution 
provides for an institutional structure networking a huge number of chiefly office-
holders, from village or ward chiefs (and ‘queen-mothers’), up to Paramount chiefs, 
ruling over territorial units that are now more numerous than the Native States were in 
the colonial Gold Coast administered by the British from the 1920s through to indirect 
rule.
4 Each Paramount chief presides over a Traditional Council, formed by his sub-
chiefs and the chiefs of towns and villages under his jurisdiction.
5 All the Paramount 
Chiefs within each Region constitute a Regional House of Chiefs. There is also a 
National House of Chiefs, whose members are expressed by the 10 Regional Houses 
and whose President ranks amongst the very top positions in the protocol of the 
Republic. The National House of Chiefs has the last word in matters pertaining 
Chieftaincy. The Houses of Chiefs have the power to recognize and withhold 
recognition to chiefs.  
For decades the Governments of Ghana included a Secretariat for Chieftaincy Affairs. 
In late 2005, following a much debated decision, its functions were subsumed by a 
newly instituted Ministry for Culture and Chieftaincy Affairs: an association which is 
extremely revealing of a still unresolved ambiguity surrounding the collocation of 
Chieftaincy within the National political system. Some members of the Council of State 
– the top advisory body – are nominated by the President in their capacity as chiefs. 
Moreover, Traditional Councils nominate their candidates to sit in the District 
Assemblies – the basic structure of local government – in the group of non-elected 
members (30% of total membership) appointed by the head of state in consultation with 
traditional authorities and other interest groups.  
                                                 
4 During the past 5 decades local aspirations to autonomy and higher institutional relevance – determined 
several secessions and brought about several new Paramountcies and Traditional Councils. These 
processes are strictly interwoven with developments in the historical geography of Ghana local 
government system (creation or suppression of Districts). See Harris, 1993. 
5 Membership of  each Traditional council is also determined by local ‘constitutional’ history and custom.    4
According to Constitution, chiefs cannot join political parties and cannot become MPs, 
but they can be appointed to public offices for which they have individual qualifications 
and serve in public institutions that are formally non-partisan. A prominent example 
among very many is offered by the omanhene of New Juaben, Eastern region, who was 
the Statistician of the State during Rawlings’ two mandates as elected head of state. 
District Assemblies are non-partisan bodies and a number of chiefs well beyond the 
provision of presidential appointees sits in assemblies in all capacities.   
The number of individuals occupying positions of responsibility and power in 
government and public administration who are also chiefs in a different capacity is 
extremely high. Many academic staff are chiefs. This is also true of business, and the 
professions. Chiefly positions and titles are sought for actively by the Ghanaian elite. 
Without any doubt, Chieftaincy provides a consistent focus for players at all social 
levels. It is an outstanding path to social recognition and political influence.  
Consequently Chieftaincy is a very visible feature of Ghanaian life. If you switch the 
TV, you’ll find that the great majority of public events in the institutional and political 
life of the Republic – including presidential speeches – take place in settings of chiefly 
pageantry, where top political figures at national, regional or local level deal with 
‘traditional authorities’ which represent specific communities or sections of society. 
Interestingly, it is on these occasions that chiefs are most likely to put forward requests, 
pleas, wishes and aspirations on behalf of their communities (concerning schools, roads, 
electricity, health services, etc.) to the Government members who are present.      
Leaving aside formal institutional roles and overexposure in the media, it is quite 
difficult to assess the relevance of Chieftaincy and its specific ways of operating 
(‘ruling’) to the life of Ghanaian citizens. The divide between rural and urban settings 
has to be considered: chiefs and their palaces and councils are generally closer and more 
able to exert influence on the lives of their ‘subjects’ in smaller communities (rural and 
semi-urban) than in big towns and cities. Chiefs have a great deal of control on land 
allocation: farming is therefore one of the spheres in which chief can exercise the most 
power. Another of their spheres of influence is the construction industry in both urban 
and rural areas: chiefs and stool families have a crucial role in the current expansion of 
cities like Accra, Kumasi, Tema, Takoradi, Tamale, let alone small urban and semi-  5
urban centres. During the early period after independence, it was generally believed that 
chieftaincy in Africa as a institutional relic with a residual leadership role in rural areas, 
and its fate was supposed to have been sealed by the creation and operation of an 
effective local government system by the modern nation-state (Campbell, Brierly and 
Blitz, 1965; Lloyd, 1966, 1967; Lombard, 1967; Skinner, 1968; Miller, 1968; Crowder 
& Ikime, 1970). However this interpretation was proved incorrect by the unexpected 
vitality of ‘traditional rule’ in the following decades, even in eminently urban settings 
(Bopda, 1993). The rural/urban divide in assessing the role of chieftaincy is by no 
means the only factor or indeed the most crucial one. The situation is a great deal more 
complex. 
For those Ghanaians who come from geographical or social situations in which 
chieftaincy is not that important, meaningful contact with such institution typically 
occurs when attempting to acquire a building plot, settling in a different community, 
starting a farming activity, entering civil service in local government, school, health, 
and other areas, operating in community development, and assuming roles and 
responsibilities in religious groups. Another clearly meaningful experience is when 
someone becomes a title holder or a chief! Some people would be surprised by the low 
degree of previous connection with the institutional working of chieftaincy and scarce 
familiarity with its so-called ‘cultural aspects’ that can be found amongst ‘stool-
freshers’ in present Ghana.  
The impact of Chieftaincy can vary from almost total irrelevance during specific phases 
in an individual’s life within specific social, geographical, professional, educational, 
confessional settings, to paramount importance in other phases or situations in that same 
person’s life. Many Ghanaians deal with Chieftaincy on a daily basis, some only on an 
occasional basis.  
In conclusion, the average citizen perceives Chieftaincy as one part of a very complex 
picture which includes other institutional, community, corporate and individual powers, 
realities and interests. In spite of their apparent differences in status and languages, all 
these different powers and agencies are intimately connected by networks of 
fundamental ties (family, school, profession, religion, friendship, allegiance, patronage, 
region, locality, language, ‘ethnicity’, etc.).    6
Chieftaincy occupies a prominent position within this picture and constitutes a 
fundamental aspect of current Ghana’s political culture. There is therefore a clear and 
constant need to assess the real extent and significance of the language of Chieftaincy in 
power-broking, beyond merely formal institutional links 
 
2. Attempts to enhance positions of power on the national stage 
An interesting recent episode in the chieftaincy vs. state saga seized the attention of 
Ghanaian media for several weeks in 2004. It was the very successful advocacy role 
played by the Asantehene in June-July 2004 on behalf of Ghanaian Government in its 
dealings with the World Bank and the IMF during a visit to the United States. He was 
able to obtain a very helpful rescheduling of the negotiations for the HIPC initiative. 
Besides that the Asantehene, who is a personal acquaintance of the current President of 
the World Bank, secured a grant of 30 millions US dollars from the WB directly to 
Traditional Councils. The sum was to be used for water and sanitation projects (see the 
front page of Daily Graphic, Tuesday, July 27, 2004).  
The Asantehene’s initiative provoked some criticism from sections of the parliamentary 
opposition and the press on grounds of the possible ‘tribalistic’ image suggested by such 
conspicuous arrogation of political functions by the country’s main chief on behalf of a 
Government led by an Ashanti (J. A. Kufuor), and also the very substantial attention 
paid by the main international financial agency to a ‘traditional ruler’ while bypassing 
the state.  
Such objections soon appeared groundless, when it became clear that the Traditional 
Councils benefiting from the grant were located not only in Ashanti, but also in the 
Volta, Central and Brong Ahafo Regions.
6 However the episode and the reactions can 
tell us something about both the weight chieftaincy has been gaining in Ghanaian public 
life in recent years and the issues such an enhanced presence is bound to raise.       
In comparison with the unhelpful attitude chieftaincy experienced for the first three 
decades after independence, the relationship J. J. Rawlings established and developed 
                                                 
6 Some however stressed the coincidence of this regional choice with the Akan-Ewe informal ‘ethnic 
coalition’ that is currently ruling Ghana. To which objection was replied that as a priority area for 
international development aid the North has different privileged channels to funding for the sectors 
involved in the grant.       7
with chiefs from mid-1980s – following his early radical years – was much more 
positive. Chiefs became crucial partners for the NDC regime in the construction of a 
national consensus for the harsh structural adjustment policies Ghana had to go through. 
The development of a sophisticated local government system since the 1980s has given 
chiefs the opportunity to exert their influence in bringing their communities services, 
amenities, electricity, roads, new buildings and new civil-service jobs. Decentralization 
and this growth at local level has greatly benefited chiefs and strengthened their voice 
on the national political stage. 
In recent years Chieftaincy in Ghana has been demanding more recognition of its 
position and more involvement in governance. Inevitably the potential for conflict 
between chiefs and local civil servants, which had always existed, now became a reality 
and the situation continues to deteriorate. Open attacks, accusations of mismanagement 
and lack of administrative knowledge and attempts to de-legitimize the other party’s 
motivations are becoming extremely common.    
However Chiefs enjoy wide support – both directly and indirectly – from influential 
external forces associated with ‘development’ issues (international agencies, NGOs, 
donors, investors, etc.) which are in search of stable and reliable partners within local 
‘civil society’. In other words, the promotion of governance and, more generally, the 
‘growth in democracy’ is providing an influential international and extra-African 
supporter for chieftaincy.  
In Ghana anti-chief radicalism was at times a political tool (mainly during the Nkrumah 
years and the early period of Rawlings’ rule), but its use was more rhetorical than 
anything else and was exploited for specific power games. It did not translate into a 
coherent policy to subvert the deeply engrained hierarchical perspective and non-
egalitarian culture that dominates Ghanaian society and is most clearly embodied by 
Chieftaincy. On the whole, the justification of Chieftaincy as an essential feature of 
Ghana’s national life, its culture and especially its political culture, which formulated 
during the years of Indirect Rule and further refined by supporters of chieftaincy during 
the last colonial decade, has been accepted in public discourse and remains substantially 
unchallenged.    8
Chiefs and their supporters have been gradually and quite defiantly raising the stake in 
the past few years, particularly after the political change brought about in the 
presidential elections in 2000.   
It is well known that the peculiarly hierarchical culture underlying Chieftaincy, with its 
intrinsic stress on hereditary rights and privileges, is patently at odds with the concepts 
of democracy currently upheld and enshrined in Ghana’s Constitution. In spite of this, 
chiefs and their supporters both at home and abroad can be constantly heard upholding 
the ‘indigenous traditions of government’ (councils of elders, youth, women, etc.) and 
portraying them as a system that favours effective forms of diffuse participation in 
decision-making processes at all levels, from the smallest communities up to the 
Paramountcy. Yet the hierarchic nature of ‘Traditional Rule’, based as it is on a clear 
distinction between royalty and commoners and a stress on hereditary succession to 
office, cannot be denied. Although they acknowledge the necessity of reforming ‘some 
outmoded customs’, the apologists for Chieftaincy equate this ‘Palaver democracy’ with 
the concept of participative democracy, in contrast with representative democracy 
which is upheld so loudly in ideological discourse throughout our contemporary world. 
They complain about Chieftaincy’s marginalisation in the present political and 
administrative processes. Chiefs, they say, enjoy real power in their communities based 
on historic legitimacy and popular consensus, but lack authority in formal terms in order 
to express this power to the benefit of an enhanced governance for their ‘subjects’ and 
the country at large. The constitutional provisions for their participation in Local 
Government are hardly applied correctly: the ‘consultation’ Government is supposed to 
hold talks with Traditional rulers in order to nominate members to the DAs is purely 
theoretical. More often than not those nominees are the preferred choice of the 
government and not the Traditional Council.  
Their next demand is to enjoy an ‘effective’ role in the governance of the country, 
which in practice means more active participation in local government, regional and 
national politics.  
These requests find growing support in Ghanaian academic circles:  ‘The 
incontrovertible point, often glossed over by many, is that chiefs are the pillars in local 
administration and should be recognized as such’ (Boafo-Arthur, 2001).    9
Ideas on how this institutional change should take place vary. Some argue for a degree 
of amalgamation between Traditional Councils and District Assemblies, with results 
that would not differ too much from local government structures that have already been 
tried out in Ghana’s past (for example, increasing the proportion of chiefs acting as ex-
officio members in DAs, and the creation of presiding or leading roles for Paramount 
Chiefs). If nothing else, these proposals demonstrate that the current generations of 
chiefs differs from one in office twenty years ago in that they fully accept the principles 
of representative democracy.   
Today the debate on Institutional building is a central aspect of Chieftaincy public 
discourse. Every day chiefs and other ‘traditional leaders’ are calling for a stronger 
‘traditional’ institutional structure. In a typical appeal of this kind, Gborbu Wulomo 
Shi-Tse, the head-priest of Ga Nungua, spoke of the need to ‘modernise’ the role of 
traditional priests and revive ‘dormant’ positions and institutions so that they could 
‘take central stage in the affairs of statecraft, where our role as leaders properly belongs’ 
(Daily Graphic, Saturday, September 17, 2005)      
Administrative and financial training is seen by many as a crucial part of a strategy to 
widen and consolidate the position of Chieftaincy in public administration. In August 
2005, it came as no surprise that Deputy Minister for Local Government and Rural 
Development was arguing in the Ghanaian press for the establishment of a college to 
train chiefs in the skills of governance (to be located in Kumasi). This sounded 
remarkably similar to imperial British pronouncements on the ‘Chief’s Academy’, a 
school for training royals and heirs-apparent for the careers that awaited them. The issue 
has been surfacing sporadically in the media in the recent years, and on each occasion it 
has lost some of its associations with backward colonial and unacceptably class-based 
ideas. It now appears that both its supporters and its critics are willing to discuss the 
matter purely in terms of rationalising the administration and cost/benefit logic (Daily 
Graphic, Tuesday, September 13, 2005). 
However demands coming from Chieftaincy are not so much concerned with changing 
its formal institutional role as with effective participation in the control and allocation of 
resources. This means in practice a bigger share of the royalties generated by the stool 
lands, a substantial proportion (55%) of which is currently taken by the government and   10
the District Assemblies (indeed it is the main source for funding local government, the 
other sources being state subsidy and local taxation). In short, an increased presence for 
chiefs in the DAs is a way of re-establishing their control over resources they perceive 
as ultimately belonging to their stools and the communities they ‘rule’
7. It almost goes 
without saying that such positions are quite capable of gathering considerable consensus 
locally, because they play upon a community’s pride, aspirations and frustrations. 
The campaign to promote Chieftaincy’s interests and strengthen its control of resources 
and the civil service admittedly still lacks coordination. The claims and demands being 
put forward by the chiefs do not lend themselves to well organised political campaigns. 
It is worth stressing here that the constitution bans Chiefs from taking an active part in 
party politics. Consequently their demands have to be brokered by political forces and 
parties that are obliged by the system to compete with Chieftaincy for influence and 
control over the same constituencies and the same scarce public resources, irrespective 
of the personal sympathies and  persuasions held by their MPs and activists. Even a 
Government as sympathetic to Chieftaincy’s interests as the current one is, is viewed 
with a degree of distrust by the chiefs. Rumors about the wish of the Government of 
creating a Ministry to supersede the Chieftaincy Secretariat, as it was to happen 
eventually in late 2005, were met with concern amongst a relevant section of the 
Chieftaincy establishment. In September 2005, the acting president of the Gã 
Traditional Council expressed his complete opposition to what he described as an 
awkward attempt by Government to interfere recklessly with the country’s institutions 
and dilute the full independence of Chieftaincy guaranteed by the Constitution. The new 
minister would become a rival figure to the President of the National House of Chiefs. 
Echoing the aspirations of his fellow chiefs, the acting president proposed a Chieftaincy 
Service under the National House of Chiefs to supervise the work of the Chieftaincy 
Secretariat (Daily Graphic, Saturday, September 17, 2007).  
The Gã chief was undoubtedly justified in his concerns that the government wishes to 
secure more control over the chiefs, whom it clearly prizes as crucial allies, but whose 
increasingly autonomous stance and lively political initiative it tries to bridle.      
                                                 
7 Supporters of an increased involvement of Chieftaincy in Local Government often suggest the 
establishment of ‘honorarium for chiefs (according to status) chargeable on DAs share of the Common 
Fund or even the Contingency Fund’ (Boafo-Arthur, 2001). Currently only Paramount Chiefs perceive a 
honorarium from the State.   11
However, the history of Ghana teaches us that attempts by chiefs to act corporately and 
collaboratively on the political stage are threatened by the highly fragmented, partisan 
and structurally divisive nature of Chieftaincy itself.  
The supposed ‘unanimity’ of ‘traditional’ decision-making processes is a cliché and the 
product of an idealised reading of ‘African indigenous political traditions’. Chieftaincy 
is a form of minority rule which, when it functions at its best, is sometimes capable of 
becoming rule by a moderate majority. In this, Chieftaincy is not that different from 
other forms of ‘modern government’ or any form of government in general.       
Chieftaincy in modern Ghana expresses different forms of place-based identity 
(community, chiefdom, ‘ethnicity’ and region) and very often the logic of this identity is 
completely unrelated to the formalised and institutionalised debate at national level 
based on a sort of highly theoretical parallelism between ‘traditional institutions’ and a 
‘modern state’ structure. 
Chiefs are a hierarchy, and more often than not in hierarchies, the top ranks do not share 
the same aspirations as the lower one.
8 It is interesting that influential non-Paramount 
chiefs are pushing for an extension of the right to sit in the Regional Houses, which is 
presently restricted to Paramount rulers (and ‘Queen-mothers’). This act, they maintain, 
would enhance direct representation of important communities that are currently barred 
from expressing their voice in the most relevant ‘traditional’ forum at the regional and 
national level.  
In the peculiar perspective of narrow identities, chiefs like politicians and other forms of 
social leadership are inevitably involved in games in which allegiances, parties and 
factions tend to cut across or subsume their corporate sub-identities as leaders.  
The chief however, unlike the MP or the District Chief Executive (a nominee of the 
central government at the head of a District), is expected to assume a peculiarly non-
partisan position in virtue of his crucial role in defining and upholding the boundaries of 
                                                 
8 ‘Chief’ is a very generic term. According to the 1992 Constitution (Republic of Ghana, 1992: chap. 22, 
art. 277), Chief ‘means a person who, hailing from the appropriate family and lineage, has been validly 
nominated, elected or selected and enstooled, enskinned or installed as a chief or queen-mother in 
accordance with the relevant customary law and usage’. This legal definition is merely a very 
approximate reference to a variety of offices, functions and ranks whose essential homogeneity is more an 
outside assumption than a reality on the ground. For instance, we have little difficult in understanding the 
objective political implications of the difference between high chiefly office, which is conventionally 
defined as ‘kingship’, and those chiefly offices that are subordinate to it.   12
a particular identity: who and what can be considered ‘indigenous’, and who and what is 
‘foreign’. His main duty is then to be the spokesman for that identity. This explains why 
a chief is allowed and indeed expected to adopt a public stance that would appear 
incongruous in the case of any other form of social leadership. When the president or 
another important representative of the state meets communities on a public occasion, 
chiefs are heard and widely reported in the media and they use these opportunities to put 
forward their demands, pleas, wishes and aspirations on behalf of their ‘subjects’ 
(schools, roads, electricity, health services, etc.). This channel is more direct than the 
more competent institutional channels (such as regional or district administrations or 
government departments).   
The chief is an embodiment of his community in its relations with the outside world. He 
is the ‘settler of the boundary’ and the seal of a very tangible form of identity. However 
it is a form of identity that operates only in relation to the outside, while inside his 
community he is primarily the leader of a faction. 
This particular role is the most enduring feature of Chieftaincy in Ghana, and the reason 
why it is needed for Ghanaian society’s self-image. And yet this is also the factor that 
makes it so difficult politically for a chief to survive in his position.   
 
3. Chieftaincy conflicts in the Western Region 
  All these elements make Chieftaincy a quintessentially unstable world which is 
constantly affected by high levels of conflict and is itself a principal cause of disruptive 
disputes, as the recent history of the Northern Region of Ghana clearly shows. 
The main causes of Chieftaincy disputes are disagreements over succession to office, 
struggles to create new Traditional Councils (i.e. to operate secessions from existing 
Paramount stools and skins and, establish new independent units), and jurisdictional 
litigation over land. 
According to statistics released by the Research Unit of the Chieftaincy Secretariat, 281 
chieftaincy disputes were pending before the Judicial Committees of the 10 Regional   13
Houses of Chiefs in August 2005.
9 However this number did not account for the 
disputes and litigation that are not brought before the Houses of Chiefs. Although only 
four cases were being heard, the Northern Region is known for the high level of 
chieftaincy disputes. A most notorious case is the longstanding conflict between two 
factions – Andani and Yakubu – within the royal family of Yendi, the supreme chiefly 
office of Dagomba, which led in 2002 to the massacre of Ya Na Yakubu, a very well 
known long-serving top traditional ruler, together with over forty other persons, at the 
hand of an armed party linked with the rival Andani faction. Despite several high level 
attempts to mediate a pacification and enforce a ‘road map’ out of the crisis, the 
situation in the area remains still dangerously unsettled with renewed outbursts of 
violence (September 2006); a successor has not yet been agreed upon, the funerals of 
the late Ya Na have not yet been celebrated and political repercussions at the national 
level were and are serious 
10  
Less devastating in terms of loss of lives and disruption of daily life and activities, 
chieftaincy litigations are looming in several Districts of the Western Region.  
A major one broke out exploded in 2005 around the Paramount stool of Sehwi Wiawso, 
which covers three Districts in the Western Region, including a substantial portion of 
the surviving forest land of Ghana, where there is flourishing international and local 
timber business. A section of the royal family of Wiawso carried out a move to destool 
the Paramount Chief, eventually succeeding in the course of 2006, after much 
commotion in the area, repeated interventions of security forces in order to preserve 
public security, serious hindrance to the life of residents, and a protracted standstill for 
many crucial activities: it would be risky, for instance, entering deals in land that might 
be subverted if the Paramount chief was destooled: as it happened eventually. By 
Ghanaian standards Sehwi Wiawso is a ‘big stool’ which receives massive royalties 
from timber concessions and gold mining, as well as rents from the scores of immigrant 
tenant farmers (‘foreigners’) from other parts of Ghana or abroad who crowd Sehwi’s 
                                                 
9 61 in the Central region, 52 in Brong Ahafo, 44 in Ashanti, 39 in Greater Accra, 25 in the Western 
Region, 23 in the Volta Region, 16 in the Eastern Region, 4 in the Northern Region, 2 in the Upper East 
[Upper West…?]  (Daily Graphic, Saturday, Sept. 17, 2005). 
10 was killed and beheaded, with more than forty retainers and staff, in the course of an attack against his 
palace in Yendi by an armed party connected with the opposing faction. Beside throwing into disarray a 
part of the country which by the was recovering from the wounds of bloody inter-ethnic strives in the 
Ninenties which involved Dagombas, Nanumbas and Konkombas   14
forest hinterland. From a local perspective, this conflict is but the current expression of 
a deep rift in the area’s ruling group, which surfaces periodically. The political 
implications of the strategies deployed by local actors in order to reassess the local 
balance of power are well understood, interacted with and manipulated by forces 
operating at national level. In the current fight many observers point the finger at the 
New Patriotic Party (NPP) – the current Government party – as exploiting this situation 
to increase and consolidate its hold over an area that is still a National Democratic 
Congress (NDC) stronghold. The destooled Paramount chief, who took office during the 
years of NDC power, was seen by some as a legacy of the previous regime, and many of 
his subjects reproached him because in their opinion this inhibited his ability to 
represent Sehwi in its dealings with the current Government. 
The conflict that has exploded in Wiawso in 2005 has been offset to some extent by the 
resolution of another major Chieftaincy litigation that has been seriously affecting the 
south-west corner of the Western Region for almost seven years: the rebellion of up to 
15 of the 47 chiefs under the jurisdiction of the Paramount stool of Western 
Nzema/Jomoro District
 (for early developments, see Valsecchi, 2003).  
Western Nzema Paramount Stool is not as big a stool as Sehwi Wiawso, and has 
nothing comparable ‘attached to it’ in terms of actual wealth (although the area has 
relevant potentialities in terms of mineral resources). However there is some substantial 
‘chop’ and  the office is one that carries considerable political cachet and associations in 
the turbulent Nzema context (Valsecchi, 2002).   
This rebellion was led by the chief of Half Assini, the District Capital and by far the 
most important town in the area and one of the main subordinate stools within the 
Paramountcy. The ‘traditional capital’ of the Paramountcy is in fact Beyin, today a 
small and impoverished town. The conflict between Beyin and Half Assini, whose 
aspirations for autonomy date back at least to the late-nineteenth century, was 
simmering throughout the colonial days and continued into the independence period, 
occasionally erupting into something more serious.  
Half Assini’s chief and other dissidents accused the Paramount Chief, Annor Adjaye III, 
of violating basic constitutional and human rights by expelling Alex Asamoah, a 
controversial figure, from the Paramountcy with the backing of the Traditional Council   15
(in effect this meant expulsion from the District, which has the same boundaries as the 
Paramountcy) .  
A successful businessman, Alex Asamoah was an immigrant from the Central region 
who established a substantial network of personal links with prominent individuals in 
the District through his commercial activities: notably with the leaders of the 
communities on the lagoon border with the Ivory Coast. For instance the chief of Jawe 
Wharf, an important settlement bursting with trans-border economic activities (of both a 
legal and an illegal nature), became his close friend and supporter. Asamoah, who had 
risen to the position of head of the migrant workers in Jomoro/Western Nzema, prefixed 
the honorific title nana to his name and was universally known as Nana Alex Asamoah: 
his bigmanship was substantially recognized by local convention, although he was not 
connected with ‘indigenous’ social and kinship hierarchy. Through his hard work and 
contacts, Nana Asamoah rose to a position of leadership within the structure of NDC 
(National Democratic Congress, the then ruling party) at the District level, eventually 
becoming the chairman of the party for the constituency.  
He had some influential supporters in Half Assini, although many others resented the 
intrusion of this outsider from far beyond the District border and, more importantly, 
lacking any ‘ethnic’ credentials: 1) no connection between his original matrilineage and 
any of the Nzema Paramountcies; 2) no connection between his father and Nzema; 3) he 
was not born or brought up, or educated in any part of Nzema; 4) he has learned the 
Nzema language fluently but still speaks as a foreigner.  
Obviously one or more of these elements could be brought up against a huge proportion 
of the ‘indigenous’ individuals residing within the Paramountcy/District, while a very 
sizeable part of the population is liable to be charged with all the elements at the same 
time. But generally this does not happen until a particular boundary has been crossed.  
The activities of Nana Asamoah began to upset people when, in 1999, it became clear 
that he was trying to get out of office the incumbent District Chief Executive of Jomoro 
District. Local government in the District was (and still is very much) in a state of 
permanent unsettlement (Daddieh, 1998). In the years 1995-1999, three DCEs were 
dismissed either by the Government or by a no-confidence vote in the District 
Assembly. Nana Alex Asamoah tried very skilfully to capitalize both on his strong links   16
in the District and his alien origin, portraying himself as the ideal candidate for the top 
position: rich and respected, he was nevertheless not a ‘son of the land’ and, so he 
implied, not therefore involved in internal factional disputes, conflicts, chieftaincy 
litigations. When the third DCE in 5 years was removed by a vote of the Assembly, 
everybody said that the ‘coup’ had been engineered by Nana Asamoah. The deposed 
DCE was Mr. T. Ekye Kwesi: a prominent ‘son of the land’ and a member of the main 
abusua (matrilineage) serving and supporting the Paramount Stool. Ekye Kwesi was not 
only a rival of Nana Asamoah within the party, he was also an active threat to his 
private business interests. Indeed Nana Asamoah was in charge of the distribution of 
fuel to fishermen in the area through a network of service centres: an activity which 
inevitably prompted more or less substantiated allegations of involvement in smuggling 
with the Ivory Coast. One of the groups or companies formed by the youth in Half 
Assini, the “Cambodia Boys”, attempted to engage in this very profitable business, thus 
threatening the virtual monopoly exercised by Nana Asamoah and his associates. The 
“Cambodia Boys” wrote a letter to the District Chief Executive seeking his approval of 
their move: which he granted to them. The statement by the DCE was obviously cause 
of serious concern for Nana Asamoah, who started using openly his levers within the 
District assembly to engineer a withdrawing of the consensus towards the District Chief 
Executive and his removal from office. In the meanwhile the case between Nana 
Asamoah and the “Cambodia Boys” had been brought before the chief of Half Assini, 
Nana Ayebie Amihere II, for an arbitrated settlement. The chief’s judgement - critics 
said through the interference of Asamoah – was against the youth group, who made 
appeal to the Omanhene for a review of the arbitration.  The hearing in Beyin 
determined a reversal of Half Assini chief’s sentence. The Omanhene’ pronunciation in 
favour of the “Cambodia Boys” and in support of the decision of the District Chief 
Executive was a serious blow both to Nana Asamoah, who felt disgraced, and to the 
chief of Half Assini, who felt somewhat humiliated. 
Nana Asamoah’s manoeuvre against the District Chief Executive was eventually 
successful: Ekye Kwesi was removed from office. However his dismissal was strongly 
resented by the Paramount Chief, who publicly criticized the District Assembly. 
Obviously the Chief’s real target was Alex Asamoah, as the man acting behind the 
scenes. The Paramount Chief’s reaction was in line with the government’s own   17
concerns. Although not a ‘NDC man’, the Paramount Chief had strong links and support 
within the then government and national power establishment: especially an influential 
secretary of state, Lee Ocran (a veteran politician and business executive), who is 
moreover a sub-chief in Beyin, and Issah Salifu, an highly respected army officer from 
the Northern Region who had played a leading role during the PNDC era as the man at 
the top of the CDR (Committee for the Defence of the Revolution) organization in the 
Western Region, where he later kept his residence and a wide network of connections. 
Indeed the government withdrew its own appointees to the assembly who voted against 
the DCE and even dismissed the Presiding Member of the Assembly.  
However, a section of the Traditional Council, led by the Chief of Half Assini distanced 
itself from the Paramount Chief’s pronouncement and, in November 1999, sent two 
memos to President Rawlings complaining about the threat to the security of the district 
posed by the Paramount Chief’s intimidating behaviour.  
The tension continued to increase, until a breaking off occurred on 24 March 2000, 
when Asamoah, the Chief of Half Assini and their supporters refused to attend a 
meeting of the Traditional council to which they were invited to discuss the empasse. 
As a reaction the Paramount Chief issued a statement in which he charged them of gross 
disrespect to the Stool, expressly barred the dissenting chiefs from attending Traditional 
Council meetings and decreed the banishment of Nana Alex Asamoah from 
Jomoro/Western Nzema.  
The consequences of a banishment order are extremely serious. The chief of Half Assini 
and his followers remarked as an accusation to the Paramount Chief that it implicitly 
granted the right to any citizen or resident to kill Nana Asamoah, should they meet him 
within the District’s boundaries. No doubt such an implication is contemplated by local 
perceptions of his type of act, which can be quite obviously a thorny topic of discussion 
considering the rights granted by the Constitution of Ghana. If only to show the non 
purely academic nature of the matter, we may remark that on 26 March 2000 Asamoah 
narrowly escaped an attempt on his life when somebody shot at his car while he was 
driving in Half Assini. 
On 30 March things took another dramatic turn when fifteen Divisional Chiefs and 
Queen-mothers and several hundred elders and ‘concerned citizens’, led by one of Half   18
Assinis’s elders, Koloko Tanoe – the head (abusua kpanyinli) of the Stool family of 
Nzimitianu – gathered in a Hotel in Takoradi under aegis of Half Assini’s chief. They 
denounced the unconstitutionality and illegality of the orders issued by the Paramount 
Chief against Asamoah and themselves, accused their ruler of behaving autocratically, 
and unilaterally decreed his suspension from office. The Chief of Half Assini was 
proclaimed Acting Paramount Chief by the rebels and he decreed that in future meetings 
of the Traditional Council would be held in his palace. Koloko Tanoe was generally 
indicated as the mind behind rebellion and a staunch advocate of secession from Beyin.   
This amazing development did not benefit Nana Alex Asamoah, who had to run for his 
life and left the District discretely never to return. The name and past roles of the 
‘foreign’ big man vanished quickly as soon as his previous ‘indigenous’ allies dropped 
him in practice, while using his case as the pretext for launching their attack against the 
Paramount Chief and the current ‘traditional’ framework of  the area.
11   
Their immediate strategy as a body was clear: to undermine the position of the current 
Paramount Chief by isolating him from as many chiefs as possible. But opinions 
amongst the rebels differed on the next step.  
Their leader, Half Assini, supported by the chiefs surrounding his town in the western 
section of the Paramountcy, was obviously aiming at secession, i.e. getting his own 
status raised to that of Paramount Chief and obtaining the recognition of a new 
Traditional Council from the House of Chiefs.  
Some other rebel chiefs, geographically closer to the ‘traditional capital’, Beyin, were 
instead hoping to unseat the incumbent Paramount Chief in favour of some other 
candidate within the stool family who was more sympathetic to their demands and 
ambitions. These rebels had more of personal grudge or disaffection towards their ruler 
than a real enthusiasm for the ambitions of Half Assini. Moreover a division of the 
Paramountcy would not necessarily have improved the position of their towns. 
A big set back for secessionists was the refusal of the chiefs of some big towns to join 
their ranks. Notably the stool of Nuba, historically an important supporter of the 
                                                 
11 What was said ‘in the room’ by some of his former local supporters – and opposers of the Paramount 
Chief – was that, alas, Asamoah did really exaggerate when he indirectly defied the Paramount Chief 
through his plot against DCE Ekye Kwesi. That amount to gross disrespect towards the entire 
Paramountcy, which is totally unacceptable from a ‘foreigner’ and a non-Nzema.   19
Paramount stool, remained staunchly loyal. Nuba’s land accounts for a big chunk of the 
forest and best agricultural land in the Paramountcy/District and its population has been 
increased by the immigration of large numbers of immigrant tenant-farmers (critics say 
that Nuba is playing a waiting game and present a large bill to Beyin once the trouble is 
over). 
However the rebels were enough in number to entrench their positions in their areas. 
Their more effective achievement was to paralyze more or less completely the operation 
of the ‘traditional sphere’ at the Paramountcy level, disrupting the working of the 
Traditional Council’s committees and causing a substantial drop in the number of cases 
brought before chiefly courts above the town level. But more generally the conflict 
strokes a serious blow to the already unsettled situation in the area. By now an attempt 
by the Regional Coordinating Council (Regional administration) to settle the dispute 
had been scuttled and the case formally referred to the Regional House of Chiefs’ 
Judicial Committee for adjudication. A paralysis of the ‘traditional sphere’ meant that 
disaffection and conflict were undermining communities from within and perilously 
affecting the efficacy of the entire local government system. The shadow of the 
Chieftaincy trouble was immediately reflected in the District Assembly, and 
enormously complicated the positions of the DCE, the Presiding member and the 
District administration. Everything they did was perceived locally as related in some 
way to ‘the trouble’.       
Both parties to the conflict were keen to make gains in the 2000 and 2004 presidential 
elections and were hoped for a shift in the balance of power nationally. 2004 was 
definitely a gain for the Paramount chief: Lee Ocran was elected MP for the Jomoro 
constituency on a NDC ticket. 
These developments helped impressing a different turn to the situation, which started 
evolving quickly when some communities within the Traditional Area (Nzimitianu, 
Newtown, Anlomatuape, Ekpu) revolted against their secessionist chiefs, accusing them 
of having adhered to the secession without the consent of their subjects. These conflicts 
led to attempts to mediation by various individuals and groups (religious leaders, 
politicians and in particular some highly respected chiefs) which helped to defuse the 
situation.    20
As prospects of a secession were loosing momentum and probably most of their appeal, 
the opponents shifted their focus to destooling the Paramount Chief by playing on 
divisions within the royal family and demanding the appointment of someone capable 
of negotiating a compromise solution to the conflict. Resentment towards the current 
incumbent ran high among some influential family members, who accused him of 
neglecting crucial commitments he had made on his enstoolment, such as the rebuilding 
of the ruined palace in Beyin, of using instead stool funds for furthering his own 
education and professional position (he recently graduated from Cape Coast University 
and did a master’s degree in public administration). The rebels tried to capitalize on this 
dissent to the ‘king-makers’ to choose a member of the family more agreeable to them. 
This attempt was not successful. It is rumoured that the head of family (abusua 
kpanyinli) actually confronted the Paramount Chief with a request that he step down 
trough mutual agreement, but the head of the family did not have the legal grounds (and 
perhaps the political will) to proceed to a destoolment ex auctoritate. The Paramount 
Chief requested financial compensation for his voluntary abdication that could not be 
met by the family. He won the battle within the royal family, which was always the 
most serious challenge.    
Between 2004 and 2005 there were up to eight defections from the rebel ranks: they 
were chiefs living close to the paramountcy’s capital who made their peace with the 
Paramount Chief by paying reparations to that effect, swearing oaths of allegiance and 
killing cows and sheep. However this climbdown further undermined their position 
within their own communities: the original supporters of the rebellion disapproved, 
while the general public questioned their dependability, given that they had started all 
the trouble in the beginning and then climbed down after years of conflict. It is only 
seemingly paradoxical that their main defender now appears to be the paramount chief, 
in relation to whom these former opponents presently find themselves in a state of 
extreme weakness and dependency.  
 More than any other external efforts at reconciliation these developments helped ease 
the tension, at least temporarily. Discontent over the long conflict and its negative 
effects on local society was running high amongst the population, and the main leader 
of the rebellion, the chief of Half Assini, realised he could not afford a protracted and 
open confrontation. The defections amongst his allies were also compromising all the   21
secessionist option’s remaining chances of success: a Paramountcy made up of just a 
few stools on the District’s westernmost tip was not a viable proposal and probably 
would not enjoy support among the population of the District capital itself, let alone 
Government and the House of Chiefs. We might add that the strength of Half Assini 
was already eroded in the course of the litigation by the death of some of its the main 
actors, first Koloko Tanoe, the alleged inspirer of the entire conspiracy, and later some 
of the rebel chiefs. These deaths were obviously diffusely remarked upon by many who 
interpreted them as obvious supernatural retributions for those who had imperilled 
themselves by breaking their oath of allegiance to the Paramount Stool – per se a most 
irksome and dangerous act – but especially by overrating their own effective ability in 
handling the unavoidable ‘spiritual’ consequences of this act. In short, people 
reproached them that they were unable to assess correctly the efficacy of their 
‘protections’ in magical terms in front of the their ruler, whose power (tumi) compounds 
the one intrinsic to his royal status with the one he can derive from personal ability in 
dealing with powers and forces of both mundane and supernatural character and 
establishing pacts with them. More than anything else, the death of leading 
‘troublemakers’ was adopted as a clear indication of which side in the conflict was the 
righteous one.   
In the middle of 2005, the parties to the conflict moved towards a negotiated settlement 
brokered by eminent religious leaders that would be honourable for Half Assini and his 
followers. In a meeting of the parties in Ezinlibo, on (date) it was agreed that the 
rebellious chiefs might accept rejoining the Traditional Council in Beyin without any 
further penalty or reparation being imposed on them
12. After reaching this settlement the 
case pending before the Regional House of Chiefs was withdrawn. Subsequently most 
of the remaining rebels resumed attending the Council after just a simple pouring of 
libation, while Half Assini and three others are still at large
13. 
The Paramount Chief has won this particular round of the contest, but clearly any 
lasting solution will have to grant Half Assini and the ex-rebels some substantial gains. 
                                                 
12 See Western Region House of Chiefs, Petition Book, vol. 2: 12-08-97/09-06-05: 422-425, Suit No P. 
I./2000, 23-3-05, Nana Ayebia Amihere II x 16 ors, Petitioners vrs Awulae Annor Adjaye III, 
Respondent; 05-04-05, Nana Ayebia Amihere II x 16 ors, Petitioners vrs Awulae Annor Adjaye III, 
Respondent.  
13 Those who rejoined the Council after the settlement are Ezinlibo, Cocoa Town, Bawia, Nzemetianu, 
Agyeza, Mpeasem. Half Assini, Anlomatuape, Ekpu and Ghana Nugua have not yet (September 2006)   22
Even if secession seems to have been averted and the Paramountcy’s territorial integrity 
is not in doubt, it will be some time before we know the real consequences for the 
Paramount Chief and for the primacy of Beyin. 
 
4. The ‘Settler of the boundary’: adaptation and mimetic devices in a conflictual 
universe 
Although it is impossible to predict the future development of the chieftaincy dispute in 
Western Nzema, the examples provided in this paper of the chiefs’ roles and behaviour 
as ‘settlers of boundaries’ say a lot about recent trends in Ghana’s ‘chieftaincy culture’. 
The chief of Half Assini acted in a manner that has become typical. Given his 
subordinate position in hierarchy in a more elitist ‘traditional’ environment, the only 
way for him to increase the status of his office and his town, which is the District capital 
but only a subordinate stool within the ‘traditional hierarchy’, was to attain the status of 
Paramount chief. This would have gained him access to the House of Chiefs and other 
institutions at the Regional and National level. Anything less would not have 
emancipated Half Assini from the obligation to channel all ‘traditional’ contacts outside 
the Paramountcy though Beyin. Half Assini’s followers in the rebellion would have 
been happy with improvements within the local ‘traditional’ context. 
 The Paramount Chief enjoys direct access to Regional and National institutional and 
political forums. During the most difficult moment in the dispute, when he was not free 
to move about a large portion of his Paramountcy, he seldom went to Beyin. Within 
Jomoro, the best chance of spotting him was usually at some official inauguration for 
development project involving important international partners, such as the big 
environmental projects in the Nkasa National Forest Reserve or the Amanzule river 
basin.   
In his capacity as paramount chief, he was most in Sekondi the Regional Capital, Accra, 
and Essiama, a town in the Nzema East District subject to the Paramount stool of 
Atuabo-Eastern Nzema.  
In Sekondi he regularly took part in the business of the Regional House of Chiefs, and 
sat on several of its committees. By 2004, he was interviewed on an almost daily basis   23
in the media on the subject of the Chieftaincy in the Western Region. In August 2004, 
he was a leading member of the House of Chiefs of the Western Region when it greeted 
the president on his visit to Sekondi. It is worthy of note that, the following day 
President Kufuor resumed his pre-election tour and in Half Assini visited the District 
Assembly premises. In Half Assini he was met by the chiefs of Western Nzema while 
the conspicuous absence of their Paramount Chief was much remarked upon. The Chief 
of Nuba, a key figure in the reconciliation process, gave the official speech to welcome 
the president on behalf of the divided traditional council. 
In Accra where he was doing his intensive master’s course in public administration, the 
Paramount Chief showed up regularly at official functions and meetings connected with 
Chieftaincy and related matters, and was a regular contributor at workshops, symposia, 
etc. on community development, leadership, administration and cultural aspects of 
chieftaincy.  
Essiama became for him an important forum for his activities in relation to the Nzema 
as an ‘ethnic’ group. Essiama is home to a permanent body set up in the 1990s by the 
paramount chiefs from the districts of Jomoro and Nzema East in order to coordinate 
their activities. The name of this body is Nzema Maanle (lit. ‘the Nzema world’ or ‘the 
Nzema state’), thus employing a definition that can be applied to several territorial and 
social units which, for linguistic, historical or geographic reasons, perceive themselves 
as ‘Nzema’ (the Nzema region is not all Nzema-speaking in the strict sense of the term, 
and not all Nzema-speaking communities are within Nzema).  
Our embattled Paramount Chief found the Nzema Maanle to be an ideal forum for 
maintaining his profile as a Nzema chief, and it offset the diminished visibility and 
efficacy of his personal position as a result of the conflict within his paramountcy.  
He became the chairman of this body in 2004 and managed to consolidate its very 
modest position by searching for funding from a very wide range of sources. He has 
been trying to widen the institutional remit of the Nzema Maanle. A large portion of the 
Nzema people lives in the Ivory Coast, where they occupy the territory running from the 
Ghanaian border to Grand Bassam. In spite of serious political problems, Abidjan still 
attracts many members of the Ghanaian Nzema female and male workforce, as well as 
being an important centre for their commercial activities, financial investments and   24
social relations. The Ivorian section of Nzema has always had deep links with the 
Paramount stool of Beyin. Indeed the most influential members of the royal family of 
Beyin are Ivorian citizens or Ghanaian residents in the Ivory Coast (more often than not 
they enjoy dual citizenship). 
Capitalizing on his position in the Nzema Maanle, the Paramount Chief is pushing for 
more formal and institutional links and contacts between Nzema ‘traditional authorities’ 
on either side of the border.  
The Paramount Chief of Beyin is openly exploiting the opportunities provided by the 
current stress on ‘trans-border’ issues in public debate throughout West Africa. His 
work on ‘trans-border’ issues has made it possible for him to repair and consolidate his 
recently threatened position within the royal family and strengthen his personal standing 
in the Nzema public opinion which has always been very sensitive to such issues. His 
peers, the other Nzema Paramount Chiefs, appreciate the high profile the Nzema 
Maanle has attained as a prospective forum through which Nzema ‘ethnic’ debate can 
be held, guided and presented to the nation as a whole in a manner that upholds the 
sectorial interests of the chiefs as a corporate body.  
In spite of all recent attempts to restrict the boundaries of his domain and even to oust 
him from those boundaries through destoolment, our Paramount Chief showed a 
remarkable ability in confronting his enemies and widening the scope of his activities as 
a chief. More importantly, his reinvention of his role enjoys the explicit consensus not 
only of most of his subjects and the Nzema ‘ethnic’ public at large, but also of relevant 
powers at the regional and national levels.  
He is a true ‘Settler of the boundary’.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Chieftaincy in Ghana continues to play a crucial role in establishing identities. Recent 
years have witnessed an amazing increase in the ability of chiefs to perform this role 
and to widen substantially the scope of their actions as chiefs.  
In entrusting the chiefs as a corporate body with a primary jurisdiction in dealing with 
chieftaincy matters, the Constitution enhanced their ability to change dramatically the   25
geography of chieftaincy. The creation of new paramountcies in the past few years 
demonstrates that this power has been exercised on a grand scale.  
Although driven by internal disagreement and impeded by a lack of strategic aims, 
chiefs as a body are actively striving to increase their institutional role in sectors like 
local and regional government and to acquire a bigger share of the related resources. 
On the other hand Chiefs don’t move with the same ease as a corporate body. 
Chieftaincy is an expression of specific sectional interests. Sometimes it succeeds in 
establishing areas of agreement across different sectors, but at the end of the day it is 
structurally dominated by the interests and needs everyone expects it to express, and 
these are very often incompatible with a wider political discourse. 
In other words Chieftaincy needs the state as much as society needs Chieftaincy.  
However we should not overemphasize the role played by the state in providing the 
ultimate legitimacy for the authority and power of chiefs in order to demonstrate the 
inherent lack of autonomy and the marginal character of contemporary Chieftaincy in 
the context of the post-colonial state (see Reilly & Tordoff, 1993; ….). 
Apart from its deeply entrenched formal and institutional characteristics, Chieftaincy is 
a crucial expression of Ghana’s society and culture. As C. Lentz and P. Nugent (2000: 
14-16) put it, ‘there is no greater folly than to imagine that the state and society are 
somewhat divorced from one another in the Ghanaian setting…They are in reality 
mutually constituting’.  
However it is worth adding that within this process of mutual constitution there is 
plenty of room for chiefs to continue redefining themselves in a manner that allows 
them to operate institutionally and politically from perspectives that are distinct from 
the national one. Although these perspectives easily transcend the state (Skalnik, 1989), 
they can often hold very considerable significance for national and trans-border politics 
in general.  
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